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INTRODUCTION 
A group of friends networking and trading information and 
files over the Internet may do so legally.  These particular 
friends, however, employ a service devoted solely to the online 
storage for songs, called a “music locker.”  They share access 
by using a common username and password.  Each 
participant places songs in storage, which every other 
contributor may then download to their own personal 
computer.  It seems harmless at first, but soon the storage 
space contains 200,000 songs, none of which anyone legally 
purchased.  Under certain circumstances, they would face 
liability for copyright infringement, but copyright owners lack 
the ability to discover that this is occurring.  Nor can they rely 
on help from the online service provider (OSP) whose service 
became the tool for infringement because the law, as 
interpreted by the courts, provides an almost complete shield 
against copyright infringement for “music lockers.”  The law 
allows the OSP to remain complacent, without fear of 
liability.  This is the case even if the OSP knows of the 
infringement or, in some instances, facilitates it. 
United States Copyright Law contains numerous examples 
where courts sought to adapt the law to technological 
innovations by harmonizing its interpretation to allow for the 
inclusion of these advancements.1  The explosive growth of 
technology and the Internet over the last two decades led to 
wildfire-like growth of copyright infringement2 due to the 
new-found ease in producing and distributing high quality 
copies of protected works.3  As technology and infringement 
continue to expand, both the legislature and courts struggle to 
 
 1.  See, e.g., Burrow-Gile Lithography Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884); Midway 
Mfg., Co. v. Artic Int’l., Inc., 547 F. Supp. 999 (N.D. Ill. 1982). 
 2.  See Scope of the Problem, RIAA.COM, http://www.riaa.com/physicalpiracy.php? 
content_selector=piracy-online-scope-of-the-problem (last visited Oct. 6, 2011).  Since 
the advent of Napster and other peer-to-peer filling sharing services, U.S. music sales 
have dropped from $14.6 billion to $7.7 billion, a 47 percent decrease.  Id.  Digital 
piracy of copyrighted content is estimated to take up 24 percent of global bandwidth 
and 17.5 percent of the bandwidth in the United States.  Id.  Estimates indicate that 
around 30 billion songs were downloaded illegally between 2004 and 2009.  Id. 
 3.  See generally Nika Aldrich,  An Exploration of Rights Management 
Technologies Used in the Music Industry, 2007 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 1 (2007); 
Fred von Lohman, Measuring the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Against the 
Darknet: Implications for the Regulation of Technological Protection Measures, 24 LOY. 
L.A. ENT. L. REV. 635 (2004). 
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maintain the balance between technology and the integrity of 
artistic works protected under United States intellectual 
property laws. 
The struggle to protect copyrighted musical works on the 
Internet gained public notoriety with the music industry’s 
challenge of peer-to-peer file sharing services, such as 
Napster and bittorrent providers.4  Now the music industry 
fears that “music lockers” will become a conduit for 
infringement.5  “Music lockers” present copyright owners with 
greater challenges in combating infringement than those 
faced in their attempts to thwart infringers who plied the 
pathways of peer-to-peer services. 
Until recently, very few OSPs employed what is known as 
“cloud computing” to provide subscribers with an online 
application designed for the limited purpose of storing one’s 
music library,6 but Google, Amazon, and iTunes all recently 
released their own versions of “music lockers.”7  iTunes, prior 
to the introduction of its “music locker,” obtained licenses 
from the major labels permitting it to store copyrighted 
songs.8  By receiving a license, iTunes negated any possibility 
of subjecting itself to copyright infringement liability from the 
 
 4.  See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Inc., 545 U.S. 913 
(2005); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); Columbia 
Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, No. CV 06-5578 SVW (JCx), 2009 WL 6355911 (C.D. Cal. 
Dec. 21, 2009); See also Ankur R. Patel, Comment, Bittorrent Beware: Legitimizing 
Bittorrent Against Secondary Copyright Liability, 12 APPALACHIAN L.J. 117 (2011); 
Johnathan Zittrain, A History of Online Gatekeeping, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 253 (2006). 
 5.  See generally Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, L.L.C., 821 F. Supp. 2d 627 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011); Timothy B. Lee, Are Google and Amazon’s Cloud Players Illegal, 
CNN.COM (July 11, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-07-11/tech/google.music. 
clour.ars_1_mp3-com-major-music-labels-sony-music?_s=PM:TECH; Ryan Singel, 
Amazon, Dropbox, Google, and you win in cloud-music decision, CNN.COM (Aug. 23, 
2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-08-23/tech.cloud.music.copyright.decision.wired_ 
1_amazon-s-cloud-drive-hard-drive-google-music?_s=PM:TECH; Peter Tschmuck, There 
is Music in the Cloud, MUSIC BUSINESS RESEARCH (June 7, 2011), 
http://musicbusinessresearch.wordpress.com/2011/06-/07/there-is-music-in-the-cloud. 
 6.  For the last several years, cloud computing has been used by OSPs to give 
users a storage space for data, such as documents or even music, but none had 
developed a storage service devoted solely for the storage of music besides MP3tunes.  
See, e.g., DROPBOX, https://www.dropbox.com (last visited Oct. 17, 2012); GOOGLE 
CLOUD PLATFORM, https://cloud.google.com/products/cloud-storage (last visited Oct. 17, 
2012). 
 7.  Called Google Music Beta, Amazon Cloud Player, and iTunes Scan and Match 
respectively.  Lee, supra note 5. 
 8.  Id. 
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major labels.9  Amazon and Google, however, after 
unsuccessfully attempting to negotiate licenses, chose to 
proceed without the blessing of music labels, thereby, creating 
the risk of liability.10  Instead, Amazon and Google placed 
their reliance on the safe harbors found in the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), specifically the 
affirmative defense provided by 17 U.S.C. § 512(c).11 
Initially, proceeding without licenses meant Google and 
Amazon faced the very real threat of liability for contributory 
infringement,12  since, at the time of their services 
 
 9.  iTunes does face liability from minor record labels if a user uploads a song 
from such a label if it did not negotiate licenses with the smaller labels.  Id. 
 10.  Id.  Since finishing this comment, about a year after first offering its cloud 
service, Amazon obtained licenses from all major music labels for its cloud storage 
service.  See Greg Sandoval, Amazon’s music cloud is licensed by all top labels, CNET 
(June 15, 2012, 9:06 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57453873-93/amazons-
music-cloud-is-licensed-by-all-top-labels.  To date, however, Google has yet to obtain 
licenses from the music labels.  But, even though, Amazon has since garnered licenses, 
it faced the possibility of liability for infringement for nearly a year.   
 11.  (c) Information residing on systems or networks at direction of users. 
(1) In general. – A service provider shall not be liable . . . for infringement of 
copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material that 
resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service 
provider, if that service provider: 
(A)(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using 
the material on the system or network is infringing; 
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or 
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or 
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, act expeditiously to remove, 
or disable access, to the material; 
(B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing 
activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right and ability to 
control such activity; and 
(C) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in paragraph (3), 
responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is 
claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity. 
17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2006).  
 12.  “Contributory infringement occurs when a defendant induces, causes, or 
materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another, with knowledge of the 
infringing activity.”  3-12A Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT § 12A.01(Matthew Bender, rev. ed. 2012); see, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 
Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (finding a peer-to-peer service 
provider liable for contributory infringement because it induced its users to commit 
direct infringement); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 
(1984) (discussing whether a manufacturer of video cassette recorders could be liable 
for contributory infringement for owners of the recorders who use them to copy 
television programs); Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(finding plaintiff could state a claim for contributory infringement against the owner of 
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announcement, it remained uncertain whether “music 
lockers” could qualify for protection under § 512(c).13  Judge 
William Pauley answered this question, at least for the 
interim,14 by holding that a “music locker” could qualify for 
the safe harbor of § 512(c) if the OSP met its requirements.15  
Judge Pauley’s ruling sustained the trend began by previous 
courts, which continually frustrates the music industry’s 
efforts to protect its works on the Internet. In reaching his 
decision, Judge Pauley employed a standard of apparent 
knowledge that, in fact, is actual knowledge.  And, further, 
the standard of actual knowledge Judge Pauley and other 
courts currently employ effective eliminates any possibility of 
finding it exists, absent the copyright owner actually 
informing the OSP of that specific infringement.16 
The definitions of apparent and actual knowledge 
employed by the courts, along with the courts’ strict 
requirements for issuing a compliant takedown notice,17 
create substantial hurdles for copyright owners who endeavor 
 
a swap meet when it was aware vendors sold recordings that infringed the plaintiffs’ 
copyrights). 
 13.  Amazon, Google, and iTunes all announced their music lockers prior to the 
decision in MP3tunes.  See Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, L.L.C., 821 F. Supp. 2d 
627 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Lee, supra note 5. 
 14.  Capitol Records plans to appeal the decision.  Christopher S. Harrison, Capital 
Punishment? EMI Wins Battle but May Lose War, MUSIC LAW SEMINAR (Aug. 29, 2011), 
http://musiclawseminar.com/2011/08/29/capital-punishment-emi-wins-the-battle-but-
may-lose-war. 
 15.  Capitol Records, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 2d at 650-51. 
 16.  See Keith Black, Note, Technical Knockout: How Mixed Martial Arts Will 
Change Copyright Infringement on the Web, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. 
L.J. 739, 773 (2011); Liliana Chang, Note, The Red Flag Test for Apparent Knowledge 
Under the DMCA §512(c) Safe Harbor, 28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 195, 203 (2010); 
See also § 512(c)(1)(A)(i)-(ii). 
 17.  (3) Elements of notification: 
(A) To be effective under this subsection, a notification of claimed 
infringement . . . [must] include[] substantially the following: 
(i) A physical or electronic signature of a person authorized to act on behalf of 
the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed. 
(ii) Identification of the material that is claimed to be infringing, or, if multiple 
works at a single online site are covered by a single notification, a 
representative list of such works at that site. 
(iii) Identification of the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the 
subject of infringing activity and that is to be removed or access to which is to 
be disable, and information reasonably sufficient to permit the service 
provider to locate the material.  
DMCA § 512(c)(3)(A)(i)-(iii). 
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to prevent infringement on “music lockers.”18  This note will 
examine the safe harbor and takedown procedures found in § 
512(c) and its application to “music lockers.”  It will 
demonstrate that the courts’ interpretation of § 512(c) shields 
OSPs from liability by misconstruing the standards of actual 
and apparent knowledge as enacted by Congress.  This 
misapplication creates barriers that inhibit the music 
industry’s ability to combat infringement on “music lockers” 
because their characteristics make issuing a takedown notice 
a practical impossibility.  In addition, the combination of 
heightened knowledge standards and the copyright holders’ 
inability to issue takedown notices has the potential to allow 
“music lockers” to become safe harbors for infringement. 
Part I A will provide background on the general aspects of 
cloud computing as employed by “music lockers” while 
identifying the differences among Amazon, Google, and 
iTunes’s “music lockers.”  Part I B discusses the safe harbor 
provision and the notice and takedown procedures provided 
by § 512(c) of the DMCA.  Part II examines the development 
of the application § 512(c)’s knowledge and takedown 
provisions through case law.  Part III develops a functional 
standard for assessing the liability of a “music locker,” which 
is based on courts’ decision construing § 512(c).  Part IV poses 
alternative solutions that would ensure that copyright owners 
received compensation for the use of their works on “music 
lockers” without subjecting the OSPs to liability for 
contributory infringement. 
 
 18.  Not only do the courts’ interpretations of § 512(c) have ramifications on the 
music industry in preventing infringement on cloud services but also the video game 
industry, as there have been recent shifts to increasingly employ cloud computing in 
the distribution and storage of video games.  See IGDA Chief: Cloud Gaming Costs to 
Rise, GAMESPOT.COM (Jan. 17, 2012, 2:39 AM), http://www.gamespot.com/news/igda-
chief-cloud-gaming-costs-to-rise-6348679; see, e.g., ONLIVE, http://www.onlive.com (last 
visited Oct. 17, 2012). 
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I. THE CLOUD AND THE DMCA: “GIMME SHELTER”19 FROM 
INFRINGEMENT 
A. Cloud Computing: Bringing “Music Lockers” to a Computer 
Near You 
The increasing use and popularity of cloud computing is 
attributable to the efficiencies and cost savings it provides.20  
Early development and implementation of cloud computing 
occurred in the private sector, but since that time, its 
application has expanded to the public sector.21  “Music 
lockers,” such as those offered by Amazon, Google, and 
iTunes, are only made available through the use of cloud 
computing.22  An apt analogy is that “music lockers” are 
external hard drives on which only songs can be stored, but 
instead of connecting to the computer via a USB cable one 
connects to it through the Internet.23 
All uses of cloud computing are classified as one of three 
models; platform as a service (PaaS), infrastructure as a 
service (IaaS), or software as a service (SaaS).24  “Music 
lockers” constitute SaaS;25 other SaaS providers, that many 
are familiar with, include YouTube and Facebook.26  SaaS 
clouds are accessible through the Internet by using a web 
browser27 or through downloadable applications, or “apps.”28  
 
 19.  THE ROLLING STONES, Gimme Shelter, on LET IT BLEED (Decca 1969).  
 20.  LEE BADGER ET AL., DRAFT CLOUD COMPUTING SYNOPSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 5-4 (2011), available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/800-
146/Draft-INST-SP800-146.pdf; Asher Kent, Cloud Computing and the RIAA, ARTHUR’S 
LAW INDUSTRY INSIDER (June 20, 2011), http://artherworldblog.wordpress.com/ 
2011/06/20/cloud-computing-an-the-riaa. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Tschmuck, supra note 5. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  BADGER ET AL., supra note 20, at 2-1-2-2. 
 25.  See id. 
 26.  Marc Aaron Melzer, Copyright Enforcement in the Cloud, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 403, 405 (2011).  Megaupload was also a SaaS cloud platform 
before the Federal Government shut it down. See id.  See, Jeremy Pelofsky, U.S. 
accuses Megaupload of copyright infringement, REUTERS (Jan 19, 2012 6:23 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/19/us-usa-crime-piracy-
idUSTRE80I2422012011, for a discussion Megaupload’s copyright infringement, which 
demonstrates the concerns that the music industry has over the development of cloud 
storage for songs. 
 27.  BADGER ET AL, supra note 20, at 2-1. 
 28.  Amazon, Google, and iTunes’s “music locker” programs are downloaded as 
PAVLICK_MUSIC LOCKERS 1/31/2013  5:26 PM 
254 Seton Hall Journal of Sports and Entertainment Law [Vol. 23.1 
 
A user in a SaaS cloud, unlike a user in PaaS and IaaS 
clouds, exercises little control of the cloud.29  Instead, the OSP 
retains much of the influence over the program’s features.30 
Broad network access is an essential characteristic of 
cloud based “music lockers,”31 meaning that a user may access 
a “music locker” through standard internet-capable devices 
connected to the network.32  These devices include cellphones, 
laptops, and tablets.33  The free sharing and access of other 
users’ files, provided by broad network access, is what makes 
it so attractive.34  Yet, the same reasons for its attractiveness, 
also makes it a potential threat as a vehicle for infringement. 
“Music lockers,” however, contrary to the majority of broad 
network access services, do not allow the free exchange of files 
between users.35  Instead, a user’s music catalog remains 
viewable and accessible only to that user. While this may at 
first appear beneficial to copyright holders by making 
infringement more difficult, they fear users will share 
passwords.  In addition, copyright holders are also 
apprehensive due to the lockers’ inaccessibility, which make it 
challenging to adequately identify and locate incidents of 
infringement.36 
“Music lockers” can employ one of two methods to store the 
songs on their servers.37  The first method involves the OSP 
storing an individual copy of each song uploaded for every 
user,38 potentially resulting in the OSP storing millions of 
identical copies of the same song.  This option comes with two 
prominent draw backs: (1) long upload times for users 
compared to other storage methods because of massive 
 
apps for phones, tablets, PCs, and other devices with such functionality. 
 29.  BADGER ET AL, supra note 20, at 2-1; Melzer, supra note 26, at 410. 
 30.  BADGER ET AL, supra note 20, at 2-1; Melzer, supra note 26, at 410. 
 31.  Melzer, supra note 26, at 409.  YouTube and Facebook are also broad network 
access services.  Id. at 405, 408. 
 32.  BADGER ET AL., supra note 20, at 2-1; see also Melzer supra note 26, at 407-08. 
 33.  BADGER ET AL., supra note 20, at 2-1; Melzer, supra note 26, at 408. 
 34.  Melzer, supra note 26, at 407; see also BADGER ET AL., supra note 20, at 5-1. 
 35.  See, BADGER ET AL., supra note 20, 5-6-5-7 for a description of how a SaaS 
provider can isolate users preventing the free sharing of files. 
 36.  This is due to the required specificity of notice in issuing a compliant takedown 
notice.  See infra Part I.C. 
 37.  Tschmuck, supra note 5. 
 38.  Id. 
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bandwidth usage,39 and (2) it requires the OSP to devote more 
servers to storage capabilities than it may need to otherwise.40 
Google and Amazon both elected to employ this storage 
option, despite its shortcomings, for legal reasons.41  Both still 
remain uncertain as to whether a “music locker” can qualify 
for the safe harbor of § 512(c) because of the potential reversal 
of Judge Pauley’s decision in MP3tunes on appeal.  As a result 
of this uncertainty, Amazon and Google continue to store 
songs this way because it would allow them to assert a 
defense based on the Second Circuit’s holding in Cartoon 
Network, L.L.P. v. CSC Holdings, Inc.42  In Cartoon Network, 
the defendant, a cable provider, was held not liable for 
contributory infringement when its customers used digital 
recording devices to copy television programs because the 
court determined that the users, not the cable provider, 
created the infringing copies.43  For the same reasons that the 
court found the defendant not liable in Cartoon Network, 
Amazon and Google hope to garner a similar declaration if 
sued for infringement because their users direct the locker to 
make the copies of the songs.44 
The second storage method which OSPs may employ is “a 
‘real’ cloud based solution.”45  When using this option the OSP 
divides an uploaded song into separate digital portions.46  
These portions are called hash tags and are later used to 
identify and reassemble the song when users wish to 
download or stream it from their lockers.47  If another user 
uploads a song that the OSP already created hash tags for, 
the OSP will recognize the song through the previously made 
hash tags, and then delete the newly created, redundant 
tags.48  Essentially, the OSP server stores a single copy of a 
 
 39.  Singel, supra note 5 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Lee, supra note 5. 
 42.  Cartoon Network, L.L.P. v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008); see 
also Lee, supra note 5. 
 43.  Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 140. 
 44.  Lee, supra note 5. 
 45.  Tschmuck supra note 5. 
 46.  Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, L.L.C., 821 F. Supp. 2d 821, 634 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011). 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  See id. 
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song, which all users owning that song share.49  Because an 
OSP does not need to store multiple copies of the same song it 
is left with other options to employ its resources.  It can either 
devote server space to other purposes, or it can forego the use 
of extra servers, thereby, saving on costs.50  Also, not only do 
OSPs reap the rewards of the “‘real’ cloud based solution”51 
but users also benefit by experiencing shorter upload times 
than the method employed by Google and Amazon allows.52 
As for the legality of this method of storage, MP3tunes 
created hash tags to store its music,53 and the court in 
permitting MP3tunes the safe harbor of § 512(c) paved the 
way for Google and Amazon to adopt this method.54  Dropbox, 
a SaaS cloud storage service, though not a “music locker,” also 
employs hash tags for all users’ files uploaded: including 
movies, documents, and songs.55  iTunes, not fearing liability 
because of the licenses it obtained from the music labels,56 
chose this approach for storage as well.57 
Cloud computing, as applied in “music lockers,” offers 
OSPs innovative approaches to develop new services for users 
which can benefit the music industry by limiting a user’s 
ability to commit infringement.  But, as with most other 
online services, it can also facilitate infringement.  As a result 
of the insulation offered by the “music lockers,” hurdles exist 
for copyright holders in combating infringement unless the 
OSPs aid copyright holders in their enforcement efforts. 
B. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s Limitations on 
Liability for Copyright Infringement § 512: The Dual 
 
 49.  Tschmuck, supra note 5. 
 50.  Singel, supra note 5. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Capitol Records, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 634; see also Singel, supra note 5. 
 54.  The OSP, however, would not be able to use that same song file merely because 
it possessed the same song title; all aspects of the uploaded file must be identical.  
Singel, supra note 5. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Lee, supra note 5.  iTunes is free to use master copies of songs, in addition to 
hash marks, and does not have to worry about matching file sizes and other aspects of 
uploaded files because of the licenses.  Singel, supra note 5.  Further, iTunes scan and 
match also provides users with a higher quality copy of a song if the song the user 
uploads quality is inferior compared to that available on iTunes.  Id. 
 57.  Tschmuck, supra note 5. 
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Goals of Internet Copyright Law 
The Constitution empowers Congress with the ability to 
promote the advancement of science and art by securing 
monopolies for creators for a limited time for their works.58  
With the rise of the digital age and the expansion of the 
Internet, the monopolies granted to musical works faced 
increasing threats of infringement.59  In order to provide 
copyright holders with “reasonable assurance that they will 
be protected against massive piracy,”60 and to provide 
assurance to OSPs by clarifying their liability,61 Congress 
passed the DMCA in 1998.62  The act was an attempt to 
balance the concerns of both copyright owners and OSPs in its 
approach to infringement63 and, thereby, promote both the 
sciences and the arts. 
First, the DMCA departed from previous copyright laws in 
one of its two articles by focusing on preventing parties from 
tampering with tools, known as digital rights management 
(DRM),64 which are imbedded in copyrighted works to prevent 
potential infringers from copying the work.65  Thus, instead of 
protecting the copyrighted works themselves, Congress chose 
to protect the means of protection.  Congress provided these 
protections fearing that “copyright owners [would] hesitate to 
make their works readily available on the Internet without 
reasonable assurance that they [would] be protected against 
massive piracy.”66 
The other portion of the act, found in the safe harbors of § 
512, addresses the concerns of OSPs by offering them, 
“greater certainty . . . concerning their legal exposure for 
 
 58.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 59.  See Scope of the Problem, supra note 2. 
 60.  S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8 (1998). 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  The DMCA created 17 U.S.C. §§ 512, 1201-5, 1301-1332, 28, and it amended §§ 
101, 104, 104A, 108, 112, 114, 117, 701 (2006). 
 63.  See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8.  
 64.  DRM has been largely unsuccessful in preventing infringement of musical 
works compared with other industries is which it is used.  See Aldrich, supra note 3 
(discussing types of DRM employed by copyright owners in the entertainment 
industry). 
 65.  17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006); see also; Lohman, supra note 3 at 638.  See generally 
Aldrich, supra note 3. 
 66.  S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8. 
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infringements . . . .”67  To fulfill this goal, § 512 contributes a 
set of affirmative defenses, “if the provider is found to be 
liable under existing principles of law.”68  The limitations on 
liability do not completely shelter OSPs; they merely lay out a 
framework of conditions, which if met, allow an OSP to assert 
one of § 512’s defenses.69 
Section 512 grants protection to four types of OSPs: 
transitory digital network communications;70 system 
caching;71 information residing on systems or networks at the 
direction of users;72 and information location tools.73  Of the 
four, “music lockers” qualify for § 512(c), because a user’s 
songs are stored on the “music locker’s” system or network at 
the direction of the user.74 
Yet, before an OSP can claim the protection under one of 
the safe harbors of § 512(a)-(d), it must first meet § 512(i)’s 
threshold requirements.75  The subsection prescribes that an 
OSP institute a policy which provides for the termination of 
users who are guilty of repeated incidents of infringement.76  
And, the service provider must reasonably implement that 
policy while informing its subscribers of its existence.77  In 
addition, the OSP must also accommodate, and not interfere 
with, standard technological measures employed by copyright 
owners.78  Only if the OSP adheres to the strictures of § 512(i) 
can the analysis proceed to the requirements of the safe 
 
 67.  Id. at 40. 
 68.  Id. at 19.  The affirmative defenses found in § 512 primarily address 
circumstances where the OSP would be liable for contributory infringement.  
 69.  Id. at 41; see 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006). 
 70.  § 512(a). 
 71.  § 512(b). 
 72.  § 512(c). 
 73.  § 512(d). 
 74.  See Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, L.L.C., 821 F. Supp. 2d 628, 646 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (finding a “music locker” qualifies for the safe harbor of § 512(c)). 
 75.  Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill L.L.C., 488 F.3d 1102, 1109 (9th Cir. 2007); Io Group, 
Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1142 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
 76.  § 512(i)(1)(A). 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  § 512(i)(1)(B).  Standard technological measures can be inferred are the DRM 
protected under 17 U.S.C. §1201, 1202 (2012).  See generally Susuk Lim, Note, A Survey 
of the DMCA’s Copyright Management Information Protections: The DMCA’s CMI 
Landscape After All Headline News and McClatchey, 6 WASH. J. L. TECH. & ARTS 297 
(2011) (discussing the anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA and case law 
regarding those provisions). 
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harbors in § 512(a)-(d).79 
In order to raise § 512(c) as a defense to contributory 
infringement, the OSP must not have been aware of the 
alleged infringement.80  Section 512(c) determines the 
presence of such awareness through the dichotomy of actual 
and apparent knowledge.  An OSP is said not to possess 
actual knowledge if it is unaware of the infringing material 
the user placed on its system or network.81 As for apparent 
knowledge,82 the OSP cannot have an awareness of “facts or 
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent.”83 
To facilitate a court’s determination of whether an OSP 
possesses apparent knowledge, Congress developed a “red 
flag.”84  The test contains both a subjective and an objective 
element.85  According to the subjective element, the court 
must determine the facts and circumstances under which the 
OSP labored when the complaining party located the alleged 
infringement.86  The objective test then directs the court to 
ask, under the previously ascertained circumstances, 
“whether infringing activity would have been apparent to a 
reasonable person operating under the same or similar 
circumstances.”87  But, even if an OSP possesses either actual 
or apparent knowledge of infringement, it may still claim the 
shelter of § 512(c) if it acts, “expeditiously to remove or 
disable access to the infringing material.”88 
Yet, even if an OSP never actually or apparently knew of 
infringement, it may still find itself disqualified from § 512(c) 
if it receives a financial benefit directly attributable to the 
infringement89 and maintains the ability and right to control 
the infringement. 90  The financial benefit is attributable to 
 
 79.  S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 51-52 (1998). 
 80.  See § 512(c)(1)(A)(i)-(ii). 
 81.  § 512(c)(1)(A)(i). 
 82.  See Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1148 (N.D. 
Cal. 2008) (describing the test under § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) as a test for apparent knowledge). 
 83.  § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii). 
 84.  S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 44. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  17 U.S.C. §512(c)(1)(A)(iii) (2006); S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 44. 
 89.  § 512(c)(1)(B); see also CoStar Group, Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 688, 
704-5 (D.C. Md. 2001).   
 90.  § 512(c)(1)(B); see also Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 
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infringement if the OSP employs a discriminatory pricing 
scheme, where infringing and non-infringing users pay 
different rates;91  but when the OSP’s pricing plan is 
nondiscriminatory, it will not lead to its disqualification from 
§ 512(c).92  An OSP has the ability and right to control 
infringement if a defendant exercises control over a direct 
infringer when he has both a legal right to stop or limit the 
activity, as well as the practical ability to do so.93  Liability 
only exists when both of the above conditions exist.94 
Finally, the OSP must designate an agent with the 
Register of Copyrights to receive takedown notices from 
copyright holders.95  If the agent receives a takedown notice, 
in compliance with § 512(c)(3), the OSP must disable access 
and remove the infringing material from its system or 
network.96  When an OSP fails to adequately respond to a 
valid takedown notice, it becomes liable for the identified 
infringement, because the takedown notice then becomes the 
basis for the imputation of actual knowledge to the OSP.97 
C. “Help on the Way”98 The Copyright Owner’s Remedy: 
Takedown and Notice 
In Section 512(c)(3), the DMCA affords copyright owners 
the means to protect his or her works from infringement 
through a takedown notice.  The takedown compels OSPs to 
remove and disable access to identified infringing material.99  
In order for a takedown notice to obligate an OSP to act, it 
 
1132, 1151 (N.D. Cal. 2008); Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 
1109-10 (W.D. Wash. 2004).   
 91.  S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 44 
 92.  Cf. id. 
 93.  Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1173 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 94.  Corbis Corp., 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1109.  It is difficult to conceptualize 
circumstances when an OSP could be found liable based on receiving a direct financial 
benefit from infringement and having the ability to control it, while lacking knowledge 
of infringement, because the OSP would need knowledge of infringement to institute a 
pricing plan that is discriminatory and, also, to control it. 
 95.  § 512(c)(2). 
 96.  § 512(c)(3)(C); S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 45. 
 97.  See Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, L.L.C., 821 F. Supp. 2d 627, 648-49 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 98.  THE GRATEFUL DEAD, Help on the Way, on BLUES FOR ALLAH (United Artists 
1975). 
 99.  § 512(c)(1)(C). 
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must meet § 512(c)(3)’s firm guidelines. 
Of these strictures, two especially salient requirements 
exist, and unlike the other requirements of § 512(c), these are 
not merely procedural.  First, the takedown must identify the 
work subject to infringement.100  If several works are the 
target of the infringement, a representative list of works is 
sufficient.101  The reasoning for requiring such specificity is to 
inform the OSP of the scope of the infringement.102  In 
addition, a description of the location of the alleged 
infringement, enabling the OSP to easily locate it, must 
accompany the representative list.103  The URL address where 
the infringement resides sufficiently serves as a form of 
location.104 
When a copyright owner issues an OSP a takedown notice 
complying with § 512(c)(3)’s strictures, the OSP must disable 
and remove access to the infringing material or face 
liability.105 Liability results because courts may then impute 
knowledge to the OSP, based on receipt of the copyright 
holder’s notice.106  If the takedown notice fails to substantially 
comply with the prescriptions of § 512(c)(3),107 however, the 
OSP has no duty to act, nor can the notice be used by a court 
to impute knowledge.108 
 
 100.  § 512(c)(3)(A)(ii). 
 101.  Id.  “[I]t is not necessary for a compliant notification to list every musical 
composition or sound recording that has been or could be infringed at that site, so long 
as a representative list of those compositions or recordings is provided so that the 
service provider can understand the nature and scope of the infringement being 
claimed.”  S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 46. 
 102.  See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 46. 
 103.  § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii). 
 104.  S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 46. 
 105.  § 512(c)(1)(C); Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, L.L.C., 821 F. Supp. 2d 627, 
640 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 106.  See § 512(c)(1)(C), (c)(3)(B)(i); see also Capitol Records, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 2d at 
648. 
 107.  “[S]ubstantial compliance standard in subsections . . . (c)(3) be applied so that 
technical errors . . . do not disqualify . . . copyright owners from the protections afforded 
under subsection (c).”  S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 47.  Errors that a copyright owner may 
commit while still substantially complying include typos and failures to update 
information such names or addresses.  Id. 
 108.  § 512(c)(3)(B); S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 46; see also Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill 
L.L.C., 488 F.3d 1102, 1113 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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II. SAFE HARBOR OF § 512(C): LOST IN THE “PURPLE HAZE”109 OF 
KNOWLEDGE 
A. Clouds of Infringement: Vanishing of Actual and Apparent 
Knowledge 
Since the inception of the DMCA’s safe harbors, courts 
have grappled over the appropriate application of the 
knowledge dichotomy in § 512(c).110 And, in the end, the 
standards courts adopted exasperate copyright owners 
because they permit OSPs to operate until they receive a 
takedown notice from a complaining party, even though they 
are aware of the presence of infringement. This frustration is 
due, in large part, to a heightened standard of actual 
knowledge and an interpretation of apparent knowledge that 
confuses itself with actual knowledge.111 
Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC became one of the first cases 
to truly address the knowledge requirements under § 512(c). 
112  Perfect 10, an adult entertainment magazine, filed suit 
against CCBill alleging that images posted by users on 
CCBill’s services were stolen, and, as such, infringed upon 
Perfect 10’s copyright in those images.113  Prior to the 
commencement of litigation, Perfect 10 sent multiple letters 
and emails to CCBill’s designated agent to receive takedown 
notices, thereby alerting it of the infringement.114 However, it 
never transmitted a statutorily compliant takedown notice. 
The court, after determining CCBill met the threshold 
requirements of § 512(i),115 considered whether it held 
apparent knowledge of infringement under the “red flag” 
test.116  Perfect 10 asserted that names of websites117 and 
password hacking sites hosted by CCBill constituted “red 
 
 109.  JIMI HENDRIX, Purple Haze, on ARE YOU EXPERIENCED (MCA Records 1967). 
 110.  See Perfect 10, Inc., 488 F.3d 1102; Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 
F. Supp. 2d 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2008).  See generally Black, supra note 16; Chang, supra 
note 16. 
 111.  Black, supra note 16, at 773; Chang, supra note 16, at 203. 
 112.  See Perfect 10, Inc., 488 F.3d 1102. 
 113.  Id. at 1108. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. at 1109; see 17 U.S.C. § 512(i) (2006). 
 116.  Perfect 10, Inc., 488 F.3d at 1114. 
 117.  Names of the websites included illegal.net and stolencelebritypics.com.  Id. 
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flags.”118  In order to determine if those websites infringed 
copyrights, the court found that CCBill would need to undergo 
investigations.119  The court declined to impose such 
investigative duties on an OSP; therefore, no “per se ‘red flags’ 
of infringement” existed.120 
Perfect 10 also endeavored to convince the court to impute 
knowledge to CCBill based on the emails and letters it 
previously sent.121  After examining each piece of 
correspondence separately the court found that each letter 
and email individually failed to substantially comply with § 
512(c)(3).122  Thus, they could not provide a basis for the 
imputation of knowledge.123  “[A] notification must do more 
than identify the infringing files.  The DMCA requires a 
complainant to declare, under penalty of perjury, that he is 
authorized to represent the copyright holder and that he has 
a good-faith belief that the use is infringing.”124  In so stating, 
the court indicated the strict standard copyright owners 
would be held to in ensuring that notices strictly complied 
with § 512(c)(3), and that mere mistakes may not be 
excused.125 
Following Perfect 10, a court next addressed § 512(c) in Io 
Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc.126  Io brought suit against 
Veoh, claiming that ten adult videos, ranging from clips of a 
few seconds to twenty minutes, were posted on Veoh without 
permission and infringed Io’s copyright in those films.127  In a 
somewhat astonishing declaration, the court held no actual 
knowledge existed because, “[Io] provided no notice to Veoh of 
any claimed copyright infringement.  Thus, there [remained] 
no question . . . that Veoh lacked actual knowledge of the 
 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id.  The court inferred that an OSP need not undergo an investigation due to 
17 U.S.C. § 512(m)(1), which states that nothing in subsections (a) through (d) requires 
a “service provider [to monitor] its service or affirmatively [seek] facts indicating 
infringing activity.”  § 512(m)(1). 
 121.  Perfect 10, Inc., 488 F.3d at 1111-13. 
 122.  Id. at 1113. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Id. at 1112.  
 125.  But see S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 47. 
 126.  Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
 127.  Id. at 1136. 
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alleged infringing activity at issue.”128 
Turning to whether Veoh had apparent knowledge, the 
court stated that “the question is not what a reasonable 
person would have deduced given all the circumstances,”129 
but whether the OSP “turned a blind eye to red flags of 
infringement.”130Finding no evidence of apparent knowledge 
and lack of notice from Io, Veoh obtained shelter under the 
umbrella of § 512(c).131 
Soon after the decision in Io Group, Veoh became the 
target of another infringement action instituted by Universal 
Music Group (UMG).132  UMG argued that Veoh possessed 
actual knowledge of infringing material beyond the works 
which Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) cited 
in a previously transmitted takedown notice.133  UMG claimed 
that Veoh had actual knowledge because it knew that it was 
not permitted to host music content subject to copyright 
protection yet still permitted users to upload it,134 and that 
the list of artists in the RIAA’s previous takedown notice 
provided actual knowledge of infringement of all of those 
artists’ works that were uploaded to Veoh thereafter.135  The 
court, however, rejected these arguments, because they would 
require Veoh to perform searches, and “the DMCA notification 
procedures place the burden of policing copyright 
infringement—identifying the potentially infringing material 
and adequately documenting infringement—squarely on the 
owners of the copyright.”136 
The court next concluded that while Veoh was generally 
aware of the existence of infringement on its service, such 
awareness could not reach the level required to constitute 
apparent knowledge.137  The court’s decision was based on the 
 
 128.  Id. at 1148. 
 129.  Id. (citing Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1108 (W.D. 
Wash. 2004)). 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id.  at 1154-1155. 
 132.  UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099 (C.D. Cal. 
2009). 
 133.  Id. at 1108. 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  Id. at 1109.  
 136.  Id. at 1110; see also Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1113 (9th 
Cir. 2007). 
 137.  UMG Recordings, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1111.  
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fact that UMG could not cite any authority that general 
awareness results in apparent knowledge.138  Yet, the court, 
itself, neglected to provide any specific authority for its 
rationale that general awareness does not constitute apparent 
knowledge.139  Although, the court did attempt to construct a 
tenuous connection to the Senate Report by citing it when 
trying to establish its proposition: the “safe harbor would not 
serve its purpose of ‘facilitate[ing] the robust development 
and . . . expansion of electronic commerce, communications, 
research, development, and education in the digital age.’”140  
This citation, however, is to the general purpose of the 
DMCA,141 and leads to no inferences that general awareness 
cannot constitute apparent knowledge. 
Many of the same arguments offered by the plaintiff in 
UMG Recordings were later raised in Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. 
YouTube, Inc.142  Viacom claimed that the prevalence of 
infringement was to such an extent that the it alone raised 
YouTube’s level of awareness to actual knowledge.143  The 
court continued the trend begun in UMG Recordings,144 
holding that widespread infringement could not result in 
knowledge because “[m]ere knowledge of prevalence of such 
activity in general is not enough.”145  The court went a step 
further though, by clarifying what it would consider to 
constitute apparent knowledge: there must be instances “of 
specific and identifiable infringements of particular individual 
items.”146 
Viacom also claimed that YouTube should face liability 
because it failed to comply with its takedown notice.147  Upon 
receipt of the notice, YouTube only disabled access to videos 
whose location Viacom specifically identified, but declined to 
remove identical videos located elsewhere on the site.148  
 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  See id. 
 140.  Id. at 1111 (citing S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 1-2 (1998)). 
 141.  See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 1-2. 
 142.  Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), rev’d 
on other grounds, 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 143.  Id. at 518. 
 144.  UMG Recordings, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1110. 
 145.  Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 523. 
 146.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 147.  Id. at 528. 
 148.  Id. 
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Quashing Viacom’s argument, the court averred that 
requiring OSPs to remove infringing material when the 
copyright owner identified no location would “eviscerate the 
required specificity of notice.”149  A representative list was 
sufficient to identify the works subject to infringement, but 
the duty to disable and remove access only extended to those 
works for which Viacom supplied a specific location.150  
Therefore, YouTube, having disabling access to the infringing 
material at the identified locations, avoided liability, at least 
momentarily because of §512(c).151 
Recently, the Second Circuit, affirmed the District Court’s 
construction of the both knowledge standards in Viacom but 
remanded the case for further determination as to whether 
YouTube was, in fact, aware of specific facts and 
circumstances of infringement and/or willfully blind to 
infringement.152  So, while the Court of Appeals chastised the 
District Court for its application § 512(c)’s knowledge 
provisions to the case’s facts, it endorsed the general 
assertion, made by many of the decisions previously 
discussed, that apparent knowledge requires the 
identification of specific incidents of infringement of which the 
OSP knew, or that the OSP turned a blind eye to 
infringement in order to be liable.153 
The courts, in developing the jurisprudence of § 512(c), 
have limited the scope of apparent knowledge and actual 
knowledge, easing the fear that OSPs might become liable for 
users’ infringement.  At the same time, however, courts 
 
 149.  Id. at 528-9; see also 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii) (2006). 
 150.  Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 528-9. 
 151.  Id. at 529. 
 152.  See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 41-42 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 153.  See generally YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19. Some may claim the Second Circuit’s 
decision signals a sea change in the application of § 512(c), but this author believes that 
the decision is largely a pyrrhic victory for copyright holders, at least in terms of the 
interpretation of § 512(c), because no court could justifiably ignore the blatant disregard 
for infringement that was evidenced in the internal emails and reports of YouTube 
employees and executives.  See id. at 32-34 (discussing the evidence demonstrating that 
YouTube was aware of the infringement).  And, thus, it remains to be seen how this will 
have an effect on less blatant defendants, or where the infringement is not as expansive 
as on YouTube.  Further, one might even argue that YouTube’s actions show that it, in 
fact, facilitated and induced infringement, and an OSP which induces infringement is 
provided no defense by § 512.  See infra, note 218.  Although, the decision does indicate, 
that OSPs will not automatically be awarded summary judgment simply by raising the 
specter of § 512(c). 
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established that they would hold copyright owners to a high 
standard in issuing takedown notices that meet the statutory 
criteria of § 512(c)(3). 
B. MP3tunes: “A Hard Rain’s a-Gonna Fall”154 of Copyright 
Infringement 
The most recent decision involving the application of § 
512(c)’s safe harbor occurred in Capitol Records, Inc. v. 
MP3tunes, LLC.155  The defendant, MP3tunes, one of the first 
“music locker” providers, operated with membership terms 
akin to those of Amazon and Google’s lockers.156  MP3tunes’s 
locker, however, functioned more like iTunes’s “music locker,” 
particularly with regards to the storage method employed.157 
MP3tunes’ locker, in addition to the standard features 
present in Amazon, Google, and iTunes’s lockers, also 
contained an application called “sideload.”158  “Sideload” 
functioned as a search engine, allowing users to enter a song 
or artist into it.159  “Sideload” then located free music 
available on third-party websites that matched the search 
terms entered by the user.160  Once “sideload” returned the 
search results to users, those users could connect to the third-
party site and were given the option to click on a button 
which would “sideload,” or copy, the music from the third-
party website into their lockers without charge.161 
MP3tunes maintained records of all “hits” returned for 
“sideload’s” searches.162  It also kept records of the particular 
users who “sideload-ed” songs from third-party sites.163  If the 
 
 154.  BOB DYLAN, A Hard Rain’s a-Gonna Fall, on THE FREEWHEELIN’ BOB DYLAN 
(Columbia 1963). 
 155.  Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, L.L.C., 821 F. Supp. 2d 627 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).   
 156.  Id. at 633; see also Lee, supra note 5; Singel, supra note 5.  Just as Amazon’s 
and Google’s plans provide a limited amount of storage for free, and users can obtain 
more storage space by paying a monthly or yearly fee so could MP3tune’s subscribers.  
See Tschmuck, supra note 5.   
 157.  Capitol Records, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 2d at 634; see also supra Part I.B. 
(describing the real cloud based method of storage). 
 158.  Capitol Records, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 2d at 634.  
 159.  Id. 
 160.  Id.  Google could provide a similar service by coupling its search engine with 
its locker.  Lee, supra note 5. 
 161.  Capitol Records, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 2d at 634. 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  Id. at 648 
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third-party website removed the song, or if the website itself 
became unavailable at a later time, MP3tunes removed the 
link from “sideload.”164  But, users who previously “sideload-
ed” music from the disabled website retained the copies they 
“sideload-ed” in their “music lockers.”165 
Prior to the commencement of litigation, MP3tunes 
received multiple takedown notices alerting it to infringing 
songs found on third-party websites available via “sideload.”166  
MP3tunes responded by disabling access to the sites and 
removing the links on “sideload” connecting users to those 
infringing sites, but it permitted users to retain songs they 
previously “sideload-ed” from the infringing sites in their 
lockers.167 
Continuing the trend that general awareness of 
infringement could not constitute apparent knowledge,168 the 
court found that “MP3tunes [was] aware that some 
infringement occurs. . . . [but] did not have specific ‘red flag’ 
knowledge of infringement with respect to any particular link 
on [“sideload”] . . . .”169  Among the evidence the court declared 
insufficient to constitute “red flags” were MP3tunes’s 
executives “sideload-ing” of infringing songs170 and emails 
from users of MP3tunes alerting it to possible incidents of 
infringement.171  Despite evidence that would make a 
reasonable person likely to conclude there were further 
incidents of infringement, the court found MP3tunes only had 
specific “red flag” knowledge of the infringement on URLs 
contained in the takedown notices.172 
But, even though the court held that MP3tunes lacked 
knowledge of any infringement beyond that identified in the 
takedown notice, it still declared MP3tunes liable.173  
 
 164.  Id. at 634.  It is likely that the song or website became unavailable after being 
targeted for copyright infringement. 
 165.  Id. at 634-35. 
 166.  Id. at 635. 
 167.  Capitol Records, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 2d at 635. 
 168.  See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1111 (C.D. 
Cal. 2009). 
 169.  Capitol Records, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 2d at 645. 
 170.  Id. at 644-45.   
 171.  Id. 
 172.  Id. at 648. 
 173.  Id. at 649. 
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MP3tunes only disabled access to the third-party sites on 
“sideload.”174  It refused to remove the songs from the users’ 
lockers which were “sideload-ed” from those sites.175  Since 
MP3tunes maintained records allowing it to readily ascertain 
which users “sideload-ed” songs from the infringing sites, it 
would not need to undergo an investigation to locate the 
infringement.176  Therefore, the court allowed the takedown 
notice to be used as the basis to impute knowledge to 
MP3tunes for the infringing “sideload-ed” songs located in 
users’ lockers.177 
Thus, the MP3tunes court continued the trend began by 
earlier decisions previously discussed in its application of § 
512(c) by employing elevated standards of apparent and 
actual knowledge.  The ruling, however, did offer some relief 
to copyright owners, by establishing that if an OSP can track 
transfers of infringing material on its service, for which it was 
given a compliant takedown notice, a duty exists to remove all 
of the infringing material traceable from the originally 
identified location. 
III. “TOMORROW NEVER KNOWS”178  THE SCOPE OF KNOWLEDGE 
IN § 512(C) 
The courts’ standards for both actual and apparent 
knowledge elevates the requirements a copyright owner must 
show to eject an OSP from § 512(c)’s embrace.  Both 
interpretations of actual and apparent knowledge present 
copyright owners with exceptional difficulties in protecting 
their works on “music lockers” because of the required 
specificity demanded by courts in takedown notices.179  In 
order for copyright owners to adequately protect their work on 
“music lockers,” or anywhere, they must first know the scopes 
of apparent and actual knowledge. 
 
 174.  Id. at 635. 
 175.  Capitol Records, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 2d at 635. 
 176.  See id at 648; see also Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill L.L.C., 488 F.3d 1102, 1114 
(9th Cir. 2007). 
 177.  Capitol Records, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 2d at 649; see also 17 U.S.C § 512(c)(1)(C) 
(2006). 
 178.  THE BEATLES, Tomorrow Never Knows, on REVOLVER (Parlophone 1966). 
 179.  See Perfect 10, Inc., 488 F.3d at 1112. 
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A. Apparent Knowledge: “Huh, Good God, What is it Good 
For?, Absolutely Nothing”180 
Much of the case law has grappled with what constitutes 
apparent knowledge.181  Many agree the resulting standard 
developed by courts creates a higher threshold than what § 
512(c)’s plain language and legislative history anticipates.182  
Currently, a nebulous understanding of this high threshold 
exists because no copyright owner has ever succeeded when 
relying on apparent knowledge to show an OSP was aware of 
infringement.183 
Courts consistently state that in order for apparent 
knowledge to exist under the “red flag” test, a copyright owner 
must show that the OSP knew of “specific instances of 
infringement”184 or that the OSP “turned a blind eye to 
infringement.”185  Some courts go so far as to insist that 
apparent knowledge is not “what a reasonable person would 
have deduced.”186  This contradicts Congress’s interpretation.  
The “red flag” test proclaims apparent knowledge exists when 
“infringing activity would have been apparent to a reasonable 
person operating under the same or similar circumstances.”187  
By stating that it is not “what a reasonable person would 
have deduced” courts generally overlook the objective part of 
the “red flag” test.188 Nowhere does the test call for the 
 
 180.  EDWIN STARR, War, on HE WHO PICKS THE ROSE (Gordy 1970). 
 181.  See Capitol Records, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 2d at 643-45; Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. 
YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh 
Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1148-49 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
 182.  Black, supra note 16 at 773; Chang, supra note 16 at 203. 
 183.  Chang, supra note 16, at 203.  Although, this may change on remand based 
upon the decision by the Second Circuit that YouTube may have been willfully blind to 
infringement.  See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 35 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(discussing willful blindness in the context of the DMCA). 
 184.  Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 525 (emphasis added); see also Capitol 
Records, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 2d  at 645. 
 185.  Io Group, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1148. 
 186.  Id. (citing Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1108 (W.D. 
Wash. 2004)). 
 187.  S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 44. 
 188.  See id.  The Second Circuit does note that the apparent knowledge is an 
objective determination but still insists that the OSP be aware of specific incidents of 
infringement.  See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 31 (2d Cir. 2012).  
Yet, the objective portion of the “red flag” test, as described by Congress, does not call 
for the OSP to be aware of specific incidents of infringement.  As Congress explained, a 
court must look at the facts and circumstances of which the OSP was aware (a 
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identification of “specific instances of infringement.”189  
Courts, by requiring specificity and ignoring the objective 
element of the “red flag” test, have thus driven apparent 
knowledge into the realm of actual knowledge. 
Furthermore, the application of the “turned a blind eye to 
infringement”190 test in evaluating the presence of apparent 
knowledge also indicates that courts consistently require 
actual instead of apparent knowledge.  This standard is that 
of willful blindness,191 and “the traditional rationale for the 
doctrine is that defendants who behave in this manner are 
just as culpable as those who have actual knowledge.”192  As 
such, when a defendant is found to exhibit willful blindness, 
courts declare that the defendant possesses actual knowledge 
under whatever statute he or she is being prosecuted.193  
Thus, those courts requiring a defendant to willfully ignore 
incidents of infringement in fact mandate that the copyright 
holder show actual, instead of apparent, knowledge under § 
512(c)(1)(A)(ii).194 
Further, the use of the tests discussed above in 
determining if an OSP possess apparent knowledge  creates a 
redundancy in § 512(c) between actual and apparent 
knowledge,195  giving both subsections the same effect,196 that 
 
subjective question), and then, and only then, objectively determine from those facts 
and circumstances whether a reasonable person would conclude infringement was 
apparent.  See S. REP. NO. 105-190 at 44. 
 189.  Viacom Int’l, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 2d at 523 (emphasis added); See also S. REP. 
NO. 105-190, at 44. 
 190.  Io Group, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1148. 
 191.  Willful blindness is the “[d]eliberate avoidance of a crime, esp. by failing to 
make a reasonable inquiry about suspected wrongdoing despite being aware that it is 
highly probable.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).  In fact, the Second Circuit 
specifically condoned the use of willful blindness in determining if an OSP had 
apparent knowledge.  See YouTube, Inc. 676 F.3d at 34-35. 
 192.  Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2063 (2011) 
(emphasis added). 
 193.  See id. at 2072 (holding that a finding of willful blindness was sufficient to 
establish actual knowledge of the existence patent in a suit for patent infringement). 
 194.  See Jane C. Ginsberg, Separating the Sony Sheep from the Grokster Goats: 
Reckoning the Future Business Plans of Copyright-Dependent Technology 
Entrepreneurs, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 577, 598 (2008) (“‘[A]pparent’ does not mean ‘in fact 
illegal,’ nor does it mean ‘conclusively exists.’  Such an interpretation would allow the 
service provider to ‘turn a blind eye’ to infringements because the provider could claim 
the possibility that some files might be fair use means that infringement can never be 
‘apparent’ as to any file.”). 
 195.  Brief of Appellant at 3 Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, 676 F.3d 19 (2nd Cir. 
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is, if courts used the correct standard of actual knowledge.  
Such an interpretation goes against a fundamental principle 
of statutory interpretation: “that no provision should be 
construed to be entirely redundant.”197  If the redundancy was 
eliminated and apparent knowledge construed as intended, 
general awareness of infringement could constitute apparent 
knowledge under the reasonable person interpretation in the 
Senate Report.198  It is difficult to imagine that apparent 
knowledge cannot exist when, according to one report, 90% of 
the material residing on locker services is copyrighted 
material posted illegally,199 and the report further states that 
illegal content download makes up 73.2% of all non-
pornographic traffic from various forms of online lockers.200  If 
courts correctly applied the “red flag” test, as originally 
intended, apparent knowledge would likely exist with such 
high percentages of infringement occurring on OSPs.  It would 
certainly make infringement apparent to a “reasonable person 
operating under the same or similar circumstances.”201  In 
fact, the defendants in Viacom and UMG Recording would 
face liability if courts used such an application of the 
apparent knowledge standard. 202 
The present interpretation of § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) leads to a 
redundancy that prevents the correct application of the “red 
flag” test in determining whether an OSP possesses apparent 
 
2012) (No. 10-327). 
 196.  The Second Circuit refuted this argument in YouTube.  See YouTube, Inc., 676 
F.3d at 31.  The court was correct under its construction of § 512(c)(1)(A)(i)-(ii): there is 
no redundancy when one examines the current interpretations of actual and apparent 
knowledge employed by courts.  A redundancy, however, does exist when comparing the 
standard of apparent knowledge used by courts and, that of, actual knowledge as 
originally envisioned by Congress. 
 197.  See Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 778 (1988). 
 198.  See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 44 (1998). 
 199.  ENVISIONAL, TECHNICAL REPORT: AN ESTIMATE OF INFRINGING 
USES OF THE INTERNET 17 (2011), available at http://documents.envisional.com/ 
docs/Envisional-Internet_Usage-Jan2011.pdf. 
 200.  Id. at 2.  These statistics include the data for the now defunct Megaupload that 
has since been charged with criminal copyright infringement along with several other 
criminal offenses. 
 201.  Brief for Appellant, supra note 195, at 5; see also S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 44. 
 202.  Viacom asserted that under such an interpretation which allowed YouTube to 
succeed on summary judgment at trial allowed it to continue to operate when at least 
“75-80% of views according to YouTube’s own analyses” consist of infringing material.  
Brief of Appellant, supra note 195, at 2. 
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knowledge.  Under the courts’ heightened interpretation of 
apparent knowledge it succeeds in meeting one of the dual 
goals of the DMCA by ensuring OSPs will not face crushing 
liability for infringement,203 but it undermines the DMCA’s 
other goal, to ensure the copyright owners works “will be 
protected against massive piracy.”204  The standard of the “red 
flag” undermines the cooperation that § 512 meant to foster 
between OSPs and copyright owners.205 
B. Actual Knowledge: Does it Exist? 
Due to courts elevating the standard of apparent 
knowledge to that of actual knowledge, copyright owners are 
left with one option: to show that an OSP possessed actual 
knowledge of infringement.  But just as with apparent 
knowledge, courts have raised the bar for actual knowledge.  
This elevation allows OSPs to operate with awareness that 
infringement is occurring on their services, and in some cases 
facilitate it.206 
Black’s Law Dictionary states that actual knowledge 
arises with “direct and clear knowledge.”207  Despite this high 
standard a copyright owner would face if courts applied the 
true test of actual knowledge, courts limit the language of § 
512(c)(1)(A)(i) further.  They require that the OSP receive a 
takedown notice from the copyright owner, substantially 
complying with § 512(c)(3) to evidence actual knowledge.208  
 
 203.  Id. at 8. 
 204.  Id. 
 205.  See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 40; see also Chang, supra note 16, at 219; Michael 
S. Sawyer, Note, Filters, Fair Use & Feedback: User-Generated Content Principles and 
the DMCA, 24 BERKLEY TECH. L. J. 363, 372 (2009) (stating that the courts’ 
interpretation of subjective awareness under apparent knowledge could lead to OSPs 
purposefully designing their sites to prevent the possibility of awareness of red flags 
arising). 
 206.  See generally Peter S. Menell & Robert L. Bridges, Jumping the Grooveshark: 
A Case Study in DMCA Safe Harbor Abuse (2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1975579. 
 207.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
 208.  See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3) (2006).  Compare Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 
718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding that the OSP possessed actual 
knowledge because it received a takedown notice), with Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh 
Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1148 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (stating that the OSP 
lacked actual knowledge because the OSP never received a takedown notice from the 
plaintiff).  Further, the Second Circuit’s decision does not indicate that this is likely to 
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The Io court definitively adopted this standard when stating, 
“[p]laintiff provided no notice to Veoh of any claimed 
infringement.  Thus, there is no question . . . that Veoh lacked 
actual knowledge of the alleged infringing activity at issue.”209 
While later courts have not specifically cited Io for this 
proposition, they continue to apply this standard.  If, as was 
the case in Viacom, notice is sent to an OSP, actual 
knowledge of infringement will only exist for those works 
identified with a specified location despite the fact that one 
can infer from the takedown that all copies of the identified 
works on the site are infringing.210  Further supporting the 
proposition is the fact that courts only examine whether an 
OPS has actual knowledge in cases which an OSP receives a 
takedown notice from the complaining copyright holder,211 
and, in cases where the OSP never receives a takedown 
notice, courts limit their discussion to apparent knowledge 
after briefly discussing the inapplicability of actual 
knowledge.212 
As it stands, courts will not find the presence of actual 
knowledge under § 512(c)(1)(A) unless the OSP receives a 
takedown notice from the complaining copyright holder.213  
Congress, however, made clear that a takedown was not 
required for copyright holders to enforce their rights.214  In 
fact, Congress confirmed that a takedown notice was 
 
change because on remand the court is to examine whether YouTube had knowledge of 
specific incidents of infringement based on the internal emails and reports of 
YouTube’s.  See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, 676 F.3d 19, 41-42 (2d Cir. 2012).  Yet, 
nowhere does court consider that these can constitute actual knowledge, despite their 
contents evidencing that the executives and employees were actually aware that 
copyrighted material was posted on the site illegally.  See id.  at 33-34 (demonstrating 
that YouTube employees knew that users had posted copyrighted material illegal on it). 
 209.  Io Group, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1148. 
 210.  Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 528-29. 
 211.  Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, L.L.C., 821 F. Supp. 2d 627, 643-49 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 212.  See Io Group, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1148. 
 213.  See Greg Jansen, Whose Burden is it Anyway?  Addressing the Needs of 
Content Owners in DMCA Safe Harbors, 62 FED. COMM. L.J. 153, 162-63 (2010) 
(claiming that courts will only find an OSP to have actual knowledge if the copyright 
owner previously sent it a takedown notice pursuant to § 512(c)(3)). 
 214.  “Under this subsection [§ 512(c)(3)], the court shall not consider such 
notifications as evidence of whether the service provider has actual knowledge, is aware 
of facts or circumstances . . . .” S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 46 (1998). 
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unnecessary to evidence knowledge.215  The intersection of a 
takedown notice and knowledge only establishes that if the 
takedown notice is faulty by not complying with the 
requirements of § 512(c)(3), it cannot be the foundation for 
imputing knowledge of infringement to the OSP.216  The 
courts’ interpretation of actual knowledge under § 
512(c)(1)(A)(i) ignores Congress’s explicit statement that 
“copyright owners are not obligated to give notification of 
claimed infringement in order to enforce their rights.”217  Yet, 
by requiring a takedown notice to show actual knowledge, 
courts do, in fact, require notification for copyright owners to 
enforce their rights. 
Courts’ confusion of apparent knowledge with actual 
knowledge, coupled with the heightened standard of actual 
knowledge requiring the receipt of a takedown notice to show 
its presence, means copyright owners must rely on their own 
actions to prevent infringement.  By requiring copyright 
owners to issue a takedown notice in order to show that an 
OSP possessed actual or apparent knowledge of infringement, 
the courts place copyright holders’ rights in jeopardy, 
especially on “music lockers.” 
C. Liability and Protection in the Cloud: Can Copyright 
Owners Protect Their Works in the Cloud 
As a result of the melding of apparent knowledge and 
actual knowledge, and the strict requirements to issue a 
takedown notice, only two circumstances exist by which 
copyright owners within the music industry can prevent 
infringement on “music lockers.”  The first exists where the 
OSP actually based its entire business model on the premise 
that its “music locker” would induce users to commit 
 
 215.  “Section 512 does not require use of the notice and take-down procedure.  A 
service provider wishing to benefit from the limitation of liability under subsection (c) 
must ‘take down’ or disable access to infringing material . . . of which it has actual 
knowledge or that meets the ‘red flag’ test, even if the copyright owner or its agent does 
not notify it of a claimed infringement.”  Id. at 45 (emphasis added). 
 216.  Id.; see 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C), (3)(B)(ii) (2011); see also Perfect 10, Inc. v. 
CCBiLL L.L.C., 488 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 2007) (refusing to impute 
knowledge to an OSP because notice provided by the copyright holder did not 
substantially comply with § 512(c)(3)). 
 217.  S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 45. 
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infringement resulting in contributory liability.218 
The second case involves the copyright owner first issuing 
a takedown notice to the “music locker,” forcing the OSP to 
remove the infringing material.219  There are two ways in 
which sending the takedown notice could conclude.  First, a 
situation similar to that in MP3tunes could occur where, after 
receiving a takedown notice, the OSP fails to adequately 
respond thereby becoming liable for infringement as a result 
of the imputation of knowledge disqualifying them from the 
safe harbor of § 512(c).220  The other scenario results when the 
OSP acts expediently by removing access to the infringing 
material and thus avoids liability.221 
Issuing the takedown notice, however, presents copyright 
owners in the music industry with a quandary.  The private 
characteristic of “music lockers” makes issuing a compliant 
takedown notice nearly impossible because of the need for the 
identification of the specific location of infringement,222 that 
is, unless the “music locker” has a feature such as MP3tunes’s 
“sideload.”223  All “music lockers” permit access to a locker 
only with the correct username and password.  Since parties 
seeking to issue takedown notices will not have access to 
these keys, they are unable to issue a substantially compliant 
takedown notice because the copyright owner cannot provide 
the OSP with the required specificity of location.224 
Due to the difficulties in issuing substantially compliant 
takedown notices to “music lockers,” OSPs are allowed to 
remain complacent, since they need not fear reprisal because 
 
 218.  See Metro-Golwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).  
Grokster, as a peer-to-peer file sharing platform, could not qualify for any of § 512’s safe 
harbors but under the Court’s ruling any OSP whose sole purpose was to promote 
infringement on their service would be contributorily liable no matter if they fit into one 
of §512’s safe harbors. 
 219.  See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C), (c)(3) (2006). 
 220.  § 512(c)(1)(C); Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, L.L.C., 821 F. Supp. 2d 627, 
649 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); see also Mike Scott, Note, Safe Harbors Under the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS & PUB. POL’Y 99, 121 (2006). 
 221.  The only instance in which the DMCA’s dual goals are actually fulfilled. 
 222.  See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 655 F. Supp.2d 1099, 1110 
(C.D. Cal. 2009). 
 223.  See Capitol Records, Inc., 821 F.Supp. 2d at 648-49; see also supra Part II.B. 
(discussing the function of “sideload”). 
 224.  See § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii); see also Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill L.L.C. 488 F. Supp. 2d 
1102, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 2007); Capitol Records, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 2d at 642-42; Viacom 
Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 528-29 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
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the courts’ heightened knowledge standards.  This results 
from the fact that OSPs “have no affirmative duty to police 
their users”225 and “the DMCA notification procedures place 
the burden of policing copyright infringement . . . squarely on 
the owners of the copyright.”226  The burden resting on the 
copyright owners to prevent infringement, and their inability 
to issue the takedown notices to “music lockers,” allows the 
OSPs to ignore users’ infringement, thereby, creating a safe 
harbor for infringement on “music lockers.” 
IV. A BALANCE OF INTERESTS IN PREVENTING INFRINGEMENT 
“Music lockers” were unanticipated technology in 1998 
when Congress passed the DMCA.  While “music lockers” fit 
neatly into the definition of an OSP which qualifies for the 
safe harbor of § 512(c), the nature of “music lockers” make a 
copyright owner’s remedies in the section largely irrelevant.  
Instead, what is needed to both prevent the crushing liability 
feared by OSPs and to ensure that the music industry is 
compensated for the use of its copyrighted works, is an 
alternative solution to the one provided by the DMCA.  
Without an adequate system in place to provide those who 
own the musical copyrights with compensation, revenues will 
continue to drop as the Internet increasingly becomes the 
dominant vehicle for music commerce.227  This could result in 
the failure of one of copyright law’s primary goals – to 
promote the arts228 – by diminishing the incentive of artists to 
produce new musical works. 
 
 225.  Capitol Records, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 2d at 637.  But see Ginsberg, supra note 
194, at 597 (“§ 512(m)’s dispensation of service providers from ‘affirmatively seeking 
facts indicating infringing activity,’ should not entitle a service provider to remain 
militantly ignorant.”). 
 226.  UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1108 
(C.D. Cal. 2009). 
 227.  For the first time digital downloads of music eclipsed physical sales for the 
music industry in 2011.  The Nielson Company & Billboard’s 2011 Music Industry 
Report, DIGITALMUSIC.ORG (Jan. 06, 2012), http://digitalmusic.org/blog/the-nielsen-
company-billboards-2011-music-industry-report. 
 228.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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A. The Audio Home Recording Act: Framework for A Future 
The Audio Home Recording Act of 1992229 (AHRA) could 
provide Congress with the guidelines to build a new statute 
giving copyright holders in the music industry their desired 
compensation for the storage of their songs on “music lockers” 
without resulting in the liability feared of by OSPs.  The Act 
provides that two percent of the transfer price of every 
“digital audio device imported into and distributed in the 
United States” is to be collected for royalty payments, and 
payable by the first person to manufacture and distribute the 
device.230 
Previously, commentators suggested adding computers to 
the list of digital recording devices,231 but this casts the net 
too wide because not every computer is employed for music 
purposes.  Instead, the better targets are “music lockers” 
themselves.  Requiring the OSPs to distribute a select 
percentage of their revenues to copyright owners would 
remedy copyright holders concerns about the lack of 
compensation for the use of their works.232  In addition, a 
provision similar to the AHRA pertaining to “music lockers” 
would also assuage OSPs’ fears of crushing liability.  This is 
because under the AHRA, when a party fails to remit the 
required fees, that party only becomes liable for the 
statutorily imposed royalty payments233 rather than facing 
the imposition of damages for infringement,234 
The more difficult question in employing such a scheme is 
its application to cloud storage services not solely devoted to 
the storage of songs.235  In such circumstances, a yearly audit 
could be conducted to determine the percentage of such 
 
 229.  See 17 U.S.C. § 1004 (2006). 
 230.  § 1004(a)(1). 
 231.  See Aldrich, supra note 3, at 15. 
 232.  Some “music lockers” do not charge users for storage, however, these locker 
make their profits from ad revenue which can still be sizable.  YouTube, whose main 
source of revenue is ads, made $450,000 million in revenue in 2009.  Ryan Lawler, 
YouTube Revenues More Than Doubled in 2010, GIGAOM.COM (Jan. 20, 2011), 
http://www.gigaom.com/video/youtube-revenues-doubled. 
 233.  “[A]ctual damages shall constitute the royalty payments that should have been 
paid . . . the court, in its discretion, may award an additional amount of not to exceed 50 
percent of the actual damages.” 17 U.S.C. § 1009(d)(1)(A)(ii) (2006). 
 234.  “No action may be brought under this title alleging infringement of 
copyright . . . .” 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2006).   
 235.  Such services include Livedrive, the rackspace cloud, Mozy, and dropbox. 
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lockers which are employed to store music.  That percentage 
could then be the basis for calculating the required remittance 
of royalties to copyright owners. 
B. “Do You Realize??”236 The Need for a New Statutory License 
Another possible solution is the creation of a new statutory 
license.  Contained within the Copyright Act are numerous 
sections which create compulsory licenses for the use of 
copyrighted works.237  Anyone wishing to use a copyrighted 
musical work may do so simply by following the procedure 
prescribed within the statutory license. 
Storing songs in “music lockers” does not fall under the 
canopy of § 114, the compulsory license for the distribution by 
public performance of a digital audio record,238 since 
streaming music is not considered a public performance,239 
and the argument that “music lockers” provide public 
performances is even more tenuous.  A clarification 
establishing when a license is required to utilize or profit from 
an artist’s copyrighted musical works on “music lockers” is 
achievable through a new statutory license in the Copyright 
Act. 
 A new section can be instituted requiring a license for 
“music lockers” wishing to store copyrighted works on its 
service based on § 115, the compulsory license for making and 
distributing sound recordings.240  As such, the OSP need not 
obtain permission from the copyright owners to operate a 
music locker; it only needs to provide the required notice that 
it intends to exercise its right to use the musical work.241  
After providing the copyright owner notice, the OSP would 
need to ensure that the statutorily prescribed licensing fees 
were submitted to the correct parties.242  If the fees failed to 
be remitted, only then would the OSP face liability for 
 
 236.  THE FLAMING LIPS, Do You Realize, on YOSHIMI BATTLES THE PINK ROBOTS 
(Warner Bros. 2002). 
 237.  See 17 U.S.C. §§ 111, 112, 114, 115, 118, 119, 122 (2006). 
 238.  § 114. 
 239.  United States v. ASCAP, 627 F.3d 64, 73 (2nd Cir. 2010), cert. denied 132 S. 
Ct. 366 (2011). 
 240.  17 U.S.C. § 115 (2006). 
 241.  See § 115(b). 
 242.  See § 115(c)(5). 
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copyright infringement.243 
The applicable rates for a license can be determined just 
as under § 115.  The rate can be freely negotiated between the 
copyright owners and the OSP, or if a licensing rate cannot be 
agreed upon, they would be required to use the reasonable 
rates as determined by the Copyright Royalty Judges.244  On 
the possibility that rates, as determined by the Royalty 
Judges, would appear unfair to the OSP, for instance where 
the storage service was not solely devoted to store songs, then 
either the copyright owner or OSP could challenge the fees set 
by the Royalty Judges in the Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia.245 
CONCLUSION 
The use of Internet applications to commit infringement 
consistently denies copyright owners the compensation to 
which they are entitled.  “Music lockers,” more so than other 
online services, present copyright with more pernicious 
complications in combating infringement.  The heightened 
standards of knowledge developed by the courts in construing 
§ 512(c) lie at the heart of these difficulties.  Without 
legislative intervention, “music lockers” have the capability of 
becoming safe harbors for infringement just as § 512(c) 
provides safe harbors to “music lockers.” 
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